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The Point of Language in Heidegger’s Thinking: 
A Call for the Revival of Formal Indication
Lawrence J. Hatab
In Being and Time, Heidegger insists that philosophy is not the dis-
covery of free-standing facts or truths that can ground inferences in 
unadulterated, fixed foundations. Philosophy can only work within 
already operating elements (practices, social relations, language uses, 
and inherited traditions) that cannot be put aside in thinking about 
the world. Philosophical reflection, therefore, is “interpretation” of 
pre-reflective elements of Dasein’s world-involvement. In section 32 of 
Being and Time, Heidegger calls interpretation the articulation of Da-
sein’s pre-ontological understanding of being; and articulation is then 
fleshed out in Sections 33 and 34, which deal with assertion (Aussage), 
discourse (Rede) and language (Sprache). Interpretation therefore is es-
sentially a matter of language, and in particular a matter of philosophi-
cal language. 
 For Heidegger, language indicates (anzeigt) and points out or shows 
(zeigt) something in the world. In a later work Heidegger tells us that 
“man is that being who has his being by pointing to what is, and that 
particular beings manifest themselves as such by this pointing” (ga 
8: 153/149). The essence of language is a “saying as pointing,” which 
cannot be captured by signification, since all “signs” emerge out of this 
more original indicative showing (ga  12: 242/owl  123). Philosophi-
cal language can exhibit a comparable pointing function with respect 
to Heidegger’s notion of formal indication ( formale Anzeige), which I 
think is one of his great contributions to philosophy.1
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 In Being and Time, Heidegger does not offer any explicit discussion 
of formal indication, yet the importance of this notion for his phenom-
enology has been made clear by the explicit accounts in lecture courses 
surrounding the publication of Being and Time.2 For Heidegger, all 
philosophical concepts are formal indications (ga  29/30: 425/293), 
“formal” in gathering the focal meaning of lived experiences, and 
“indications” in pointing to (an-zeigen) engaged circumstances and 
practices that cannot be fully captured in, or exhausted by, formal 
concepts. Philosophical concepts themselves arise out of “factical life 
experience” and then point back to tasks of performance (ga  60: 8–9, 
62–63/6–7, 43).3 Formal indications mirror the contingencies of fac-
ticity and accordingly are not “exact” but rather “vacillating, vague, 
manifold, and fluctuating” (ga  60: 3/3). Such notions are therefore 
shot through with the finitude of existence, and so philosophical con-
cepts cannot be construed as a priori necessary structures or fixed 
universals that can ground thinking for demonstrative techniques 
(ga  63: 80/62).4 A formal indication, such as care (Sorge), is a verbal 
experiment in sense-making that simply shows a region of existence, 
in a manner that does not operate according to traditional conceptual 
criteria that are presumed to govern or ground thinking (definitions, 
universals, necessary and sufficient conditions). Rather than giving 
sense to otherwise inchoate experience, formal indications are meant 
to gather the already implicit sense of factical experience.5
 Although factical life is both the origin and destination of philo-
sophical thinking, everyday tendencies present obstacles to the emer-
gence of philosophy (ga  60: 15/11). Ordinary understanding is given 
in moods and practical familiarity, and here things are known by 
acquaintance (bekannt) but unrecognized (unerkannt) in their being 
because we lack concepts (ga  3: 232–34/159). The everyday under-
standing of being blocks philosophical insights because of its per-
vasiveness, constancy, indeterminacy, and unquestionableness (ga  3: 
234–35/160). Philosophy amounts to an illuminating disruption of 
factical life by interrogation, and philosophical questioning as such 
does not arise by “argument” but by its own factical experience of 
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primal moods such as anxiety and wonder.6 Such moods present a 
radical disorientation that nevertheless prepares the possibility of a 
reorientation through the formation of concepts that 1) articulate the 
determinate significance of factical experience (that is to say, inter-
pretation), and yet 2) retain the elements of finitude given in facti-
cal life and the interrogative openness of philosophy’s own inception. 
In summation, philosophical concepts (Begriffe) are “comprehensive 
concepts” (In-begriffe) that comprehend (begreifen) – at once – both 
something “whole” (Ganz) and human “philosophizing existence,” 
which comes from being “gripped” (er-griffen) by the import of philo-
sophical questions in primal moods (ga  29/30: 9–13/7–9).
 It is important to recognize that Heidegger’s early phenomenology 
insists upon both the necessity and the limitations of philosophical 
concept formation. For Heidegger, “philosophy is something living 
only where it comes to language and expresses itself,” and the lan-
guage of concepts is the “essence and power” of philosophy (ga  29/30: 
422/291). Yet once expressed, concepts are prone to a fundamental 
misunderstanding. Because of the reflective “idleness” of philosophy, 
concepts can be taken as something vorhanden, as ascertainable enti-
ties in and of themselves, rather than formal gatherings of a “spe-
cifically determined and directed questioning” having to do with a 
“transformation of human Dasein” (ga  29/30: 423, 426/292, 294). 
Heidegger clearly states that “formal characterization does not give 
us the essence” (ga  29/30: 425/293). The remedy for this problem is 
to understand formal concepts as indications of the task of philosophy 
that can only be exhibited and played out in life. Traditional phi-
losophy can be diagnosed as fixing on the formal content of concepts 
without their indicative character (ga  60: 62–63/43), and the danger 
of this tendency, Heidegger tells us, is a persistent possibility to which 
everyone is prone, including those who, with Heidegger, are trying to 
expose the danger (ga  29/30: 429, 433–34/296, 299–300).
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L ANGUAGE AND BEING 
Since the essence of philosophy is conceptual language, a key question 
concerns the relation of language to being. In “Letter on Humanism,” 
Heidegger indicates his conviction in the later thought that language 
is the “house of being” (ga  9: 313/239), which omits any radical dis-
tinction between language and being, since language is “the clearing-
concealing advent of being itself” (ga  9: 326/249). Heidegger’s early 
writings seem less radical in that language in Being and Time is pre-
sented as one of Dasein’s fundamental existential bearings (along with 
understanding and mood), and since various analyses of assertoric 
truth seem to differentiate the language of assertions from a more 
original experience of being-in-the-world. But I am not convinced that 
such a periodic shift on the question of language is as pronounced as 
we might think.
 In section 33 of Being and Time, Heidegger discusses assertion 
(Aussage) as a derivative mode of interpretation. Here he seems to con-
fine the analysis of assertions to the theoretical sense of propositional 
judgment (Urteil). Heidegger delineates three elements of an assertion: 
pointing out (Aufzeigen), predication, and communication (Mitteilung), 
the last of which is called a “speaking forth” (Heraussage). He then 
states that assertion is thoroughly embedded in concernful being-in-
the-world, the various kinds of factical fore-having that make assertion 
possible. He reiterates the zuhanden-vorhanden dynamic and says that 
assertions turn zuhanden entities into vorhanden “objects” of reference. 
In this way the existential-hermeneutical as-structure of being-in-the-
world is modified into the apophantical as-structure of discrete things 
with properties, cut off from the wider field of concernful involvements 
(ga  2: 210/sz  158).
 This section of the text immediately precedes the section on lan-
guage (§34), and even the analysis of assertion in section 33 brings 
up language in a manner relevant to my discussion. Heidegger writes 
that in between wholly absorbed concernful dealings and propositional 
assertions about vorhanden entities there is a range of “intermediate 
assertions about the happenings in the environment.” And these spoken 
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sentences cannot be traced back to theoretical propositions because 
they have their own disclosive meaning in those contexts (ga  2: 210/
sz  158).7 It is clear that language is a pervasive force throughout Da-
sein’s being-in-the-world, because in section 34 Heidegger tells us that 
only from an analytical standpoint do we now come to the question of 
language, because obviously it had already been operative in all the 
previous discussions of mood, understanding, interpretation, and asser-
tion. Language as communicative discourse is equiprimordial with all 
other elements of Dasein’s disclosedness (ga  2: 213/sz  161). The herme-
neutical as-structures preceding apophantical as-structures cannot be 
non-linguistic if the hermeneutical is a matter of interpretation, which 
is a matter of articulation in language. Indeed, not only is language 
equiprimordial with understanding and mood, at one point Heidegger 
says that understanding and mood are “determined equiprimordially” 
by language (ga  2: 177/sz  133).
 Heidegger reiterates this discussion of language in Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics (ga  29/30: 492–507/339–49). In line with the 
intermediate assertions mentioned in Being and Time, Heidegger talks 
of “spontaneous utterances” (e.g., “the board is badly positioned”) in 
which we “speak out of” disclosive “wholes” in everyday contexts of 
meaning, which function “without any instruction or theoretical reflec-
tion,” in other words, “specific contexts” of speech that logic and epis-
temology overlook (ga  29/30: 502–504/346–47). These contexts display 
Dasein’s “pre-logical being open for beings, out of which every logos 
must speak,” a “pre-logical manifestness of beings in the logos” (ga 
29/30: 505/348, em). The ambiguity about language is clearly shown 
in these two passages: a pre-logical openness to being out of which lan-
guage speaks, together with this openness manifested in language.
As I read him, Heidegger in Being and Time is not radically differen-
tiating language and disclosedness of being, because a more original 
orientation toward language allows for bridging the difference, even 
and especially with respect to the question of truth, understood as 
disclosure or unconcealment. If I am right, then Heidegger’s espousal 
of a primal “pre-propositional” truth is not something pre-linguistic.8 
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Pre-propositional truth can involve immediate speech acts that are 
therefore not prior to language, but rather prior to the conversion of liv-
ing utterances into abstract, theoretical references called “propositions.” 
This would help explain the mixed messages in Heidegger’s discussion 
of assertion in Being and Time. In a concrete circumstance, the utter-
ance “The hammer is too heavy” gives a primordial interpretation “not 
in a theoretical statement but in an action of circumspective concern.” 
Yet this action is something “expressed,” a linguistic act that need not 
be construed as an “assertion” in a technical propositional sense (ga  2: 
209/sz  157). Heidegger suggests a non-technical sense in referring to 
an experiential “holding” (Behalten) of an assertion that is not a rep-
resentational procedure, but “is itself a way of being-in-the-world” (ga 
2: 83/sz  62). In direct situations of communicative speech, language 
can be immediately world-disclosive in a “non-propositional” sense, 
without our wondering about the relationship between propositions 
and things. If someone says to me, “This is the right tool to use,” the 
effect of disclosiveness here does not follow a correspondence-linkage, 
but rather appropriate showing or pointing out, in language.9 It helps to 
notice Heidegger’s claim that in practice, language in general and even 
signs can operate in a zuhanden manner of immediate disclosedness 
(ga  2: 109–10, 214, 296–97/sz  82, 161, 224).10 We are told in another early 
lecture course that linguistic expression (Sprachausdruck) “need not 
be simply theoretical or even object-specific, but is primordially living 
and experiential [erlebend]” (ga  56/57: 117/98).11 Assertions (Aussagen) 
are acts of meaning (Bedeutungsakte), which are an “expressedness” 
(Ausdrücklichkeit) of lived experiences or comportments (Verhaltungen) 
– by way of their meaning (ga  20: 74/56). An example would be an 
assertion “in and for a practical function” (ga  21: 156/131), as in the 
tool example above.12 Accordingly we can summarize by saying that 
a hermeneutics of factical life includes a pre-propositional dimension 
of factical language. Likewise, formal indication can point not only to 
factical being-in-the-world but to factical language as well, which I will 
expand upon shortly.
7   Hatab
 Language and being, therefore, are not separate spheres. Not only 
does language enact the as-structures that articulate the fore-structures 
of Dasein’s understanding, even an “experience” of something without 
speaking carries articulation with it if it is a meaningful experience (ga 
2: 198–99/sz 149). Even our “simplest perceptions,” Heidegger says, are
already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a cer-
tain way. . . . What is primary and original here? It 
is not so much that we see the objects and things but 
rather that we first talk about them. To put it more pre-
cisely: We do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, 
we see what one says about the matter. (ga  20: 75/56)
 We can grasp this idea more deeply if we consider child development 
and language acquisition, which help shape a child’s meaningful en-
gagement with the world.13
THE KEHRE
Heidegger clearly takes Being and Time to be a philosophical work that 
aims for a conceptual grasp of the meaning of being (ga  2: 9–10/sz  7). 
The famous Kehre announcement in “Letter on Humanism” can be 
understood in the context of conceptualization. The “failure” of Being 
and Time is attributed to its language and not its underlying project; 
and the failure was not exactly its language but its participation in 
the language of metaphysics (ga  9: 327–28/249–50). Later in the essay 
Heidegger says something more: Being and Time was laboring to draw 
out a radical “phenomenological seeing,” but in order for his work to 
gain traction and be “understandable for existing philosophy,” it could 
only be expressed “within the horizon of existing philosophy and its 
current use of terms” (ga  9: 357/271). Moreover, he says that the con-
ceptual language of Being and Time was attempting a thinking that 
is “more rigorous than the conceptual” (ga  9: 357/271). But he came 
to believe that his terminology would lead “inevitably into error,” for 
the most part because the concepts were not “rethought” by readers 
according to the particular Sache of the work; the concepts were read 
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only “according to the established terminology in its customary mean-
ing” (ga  9: 357/271).
 Although Heidegger does not say so specifically, it seems clear to 
me that the Kehre in some respects had to do with the failure, not of his 
early philosophical concepts, but of his effort to have these concepts read 
as formal indications (as a conceptual language pointing to a “more rig-
orous” phenomenological apprehension of non-conceptual factical life). 
Accordingly, one way to understand Heidegger’s account of the “end 
of philosophy” is his capitulation on the project of formally indicative 
concepts; and we should recall his early admonition that anyone, includ-
ing his own circle, can lapse into the seduction of formal concentration 
at the expense of the indicative force of concepts.
 In this light perhaps we can better understand Heidegger’s sub-
sequent path that shifted in the direction of “poetical thinking.” Al-
though poetry and thinking are not identical, they belong together 
as a reciprocal “Saying” that tries to bring to language the pre-theo-
retical meaning of human dwelling in a finite world, as well as that 
which withdraws and conceals itself in the finite advent of being (ga 
7: 196–97/218). Thinking takes up where philosophy leaves off and it is 
intimately joined with the power of poetic imagery to embody a (facti-
cal) concreteness that concepts by nature cannot directly express, even 
if revised as formal indication (could we call poetry “material indica-
tion”?). With terms like Ereignis, the Fourfold, giving, and thanking, 
Heidegger experiments with a language of thinking that shifts from 
conceptualization to poetic resonance.
 In the Protokoll to the 1962 text On Time and Being (ga  14: 33–
66/25–54) – which is called an experiment (Versuch) meant to open up 
the Sache of the lecture, Ereignis, by way of a conversation between 
participants – we hear that ontic “models” in the lecture (e.g., words 
such as “extending” and “giving”) in relation to the matter of Ereignis 
are “that from which thinking must necessarily take off as a natural 
pre-requisite,” because “the language of thinking can only start from 
[ausgehen] natural speech” (ga  14: 60/50, tm).14 The relation between 
natural language and the language of thinking requires an “essential 
interpretation” of language (ga  14: 60/50, tm). Heidegger gives priority 
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to natural language over formalized language, as long as “natural” is 
understood not naturalistically but according to the self-manifesting 
character of phusis (ga  12: 252/owl  132). Although language in prin-
ciple has an ontic character, ontological thinking must use ontic models 
because it can only make something manifest through words. We need 
a language that can speak the “simplicity” (Einfache) of language, in 
such a way that “the language of thinking precisely makes visible the 
limitations of metaphysical language.” Natural language 
is not at first metaphysical. Rather our interpretation of 
ordinary language is metaphysical, bound to Greek on-
tology. But man’s relation to language could transform 
itself analogous to the change of the relation to being. 
(ga  14: 61/51, tm)
Yet one cannot talk about this (darüber reden). It can only be decided 
performatively, “by whether such a saying succeeds or not” (ga  14: 
61/51, tm).15 We are told that the lecture on Ereignis can only “point” 
to an experience (ga  14: 33, 63/25–26, 54). Heidegger often addresses 
such a matter as an experience of language, which in another text is 
called a transformation of our relation to language, not the creation of 
new words or phrases (ga  12: 255/owl  135). Yet appropriate words and 
phrases can indicatively point to the Sache of thinking.
L ANGUAGE AND THE QUESTION OF BEING
I now want to connect the discussion of formal indication and facti-
cal language with Heidegger’s ongoing investigation of the Seinsfrage. 
From early on Heidegger wanted to penetrate and overcome traditional 
conceptions of being – wherein being was understood as present-cen-
tered, as a reified reduction to beings, as captured by rational univer-
sals, or as an empty generality – in favor of a more original conception 
of being understood as the finite temporal emergence of factical mean-
ing. Yet it is important to ask how traditional ontology came to its 
conceptions. Among Heidegger’s treatments of this question, the most 
relevant for my purposes is given in Introduction to Metaphysics (ga 
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40), particularly Chapter Two, “On the Grammar and Etymology of the 
Word ‘Being,’” which has not received much attention in the scholar-
ship, and which will help develop my previous suggestion that formal 
indication can involve a pointing to factical language.16
 Right before this chapter, Heidegger says: “For us the question about 
being will be most intimately intertwined with the question about lan-
guage” (ga  40: 55/56). Indeed, Heidegger elevates language to such an 
extent that earlier in the text ontology itself is called “the effort to put 
being into words” (ga  40: 44/45). At the start of the chapter in ques-
tion, Heidegger tells us that the grammatical analysis will give a hint 
or indication (Hinweis) of how to understand the history and meaning 
of philosophical words (ga  40: 56/57). Although grammar has become 
a regulation and reification of language, an investigation of the word 
“being” must begin with a grammatical account, which is not a barren 
or irrelevant game, because it leads us to open up the essential relation 
between being and language, yet in a way that cannot be reduced to 
grammatical forms (ga  40: 56–58/57–59). The philosophical concept of 
being, das Sein, is the result of converting a verb (which is temporally 
tensed) into a noun (like das Gehen), a verbal substantive derived from 
the infinitive form (in English, literally “the to be”).17
 The verbal infinitive is crucial for Heidegger’s analysis. Grammati-
cal inflections of verbs and nouns identify and formalize the different 
facets of word usage that reflect the various ways in which things, ac-
tions, and temporality are engaged.18 The “declension” of verbs names 
a “decline” or deviation from a standard form (first-person singular) 
that “stands” as a reference point for grammatical specifications. The 
infinitive is a unique kind of declension compared to other kinds that 
can express specific forms of speech (such as person, number, tense, 
voice, and mood). The infinitive (from the Latin infinitivus) expresses 
no specific form; it is non-finite or in-definite, thereby rendering the 
general meaning of the verb in the abstract, independent of specific uses 
(ga  40: 69–73/72–75). The verbal substantive completes the abstraction 
by identifying a verb (sein) as a noun by way of the definite article 
(das Sein).19 The indefiniteness of the infinitive thus becomes fixed in 
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isolation from the verb inflections and their temporal character (ga 
40: 73–74/76). The nominal isolation of the verbal meaning of being 
provides a linguistic background that made possible the traditional con-
ceptions of being that Heidegger is interrogating – and that adds weight 
to his own efforts to correlate being and time, since being is originally 
a temporal (verb) construction.20 The verbal substantive “being” (das 
Sein), as an “object” of inquiry, allows a reification of being and a shift 
away from particular uses of the verb “to be” that mark its more factical 
meaning – I am tired, you were wrong, and so on.21
 Continuing this line of analysis, Heidegger offers an etymological 
investigation of the word being/Sein (ga  40: 75–79/77–81). From San-
skrit and Indo-Germanic roots, Heidegger suggests the original notions 
of living, emerging, and abiding as three stem meanings of the word 
being.22 When the verbal substantive fixes and objectifies the abstract 
character of the infinitive, it affords a covering up (Verwischung) of the 
verb’s “definite modes of meaning,” which completes the evacuation of 
the three original stem meanings from the word “being.”
 In Chapter Three of the text, “The Question of the Essence of Being,” 
Heidegger’s linguistic venture comes to a head. He asks: Should the ab-
stract “emptiness” of the philosophical word “being” turn us away from 
it toward particular beings? The answer is no, presumably because that 
would remain caught in the transformation of the verb form into a 
nominalization that now can take the name of a “being” (an entity 
that “is”). The purported emptiness of being stems from a linguistic 
manipulation, which has shaped the grammatical fate of a word “that 
is worn out, yet remains full” (ga  40: 84/87).
 Following Aristotle, Heidegger says that being is not a genus, of 
which individual beings would count as examples. Yet Heidegger does 
allow that the word “being” is a general or universal name (allgemeiner 
Name), and understanding the meaning of this word is an “incompa-
rable” task of the highest necessity (ga  40: 86/89). Its generality or 
universality should not turn us simply toward particulars: “We should 
remain there, and raise the uniqueness of this name and its naming to 
the level of knowledge [Wissen]” (ga  40: 86/89). This is an important 
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moment in the text. The grammatical transformation indicated in the 
word “being” is not rejected or regretted; yet as a name it will be redi-
rected back toward its namesake, the verb “to be” and its inflections.
 Heidegger tells us that the meaning of being is correlated with the 
word “being” in all its inflections, in a manner that is “essentially dif-
ferent from the relation of all other nouns and verbs in language to the 
beings that are said in them” (ga 40: 94/96). He illustrates with various 
sentences: the lecture is in the auditorium; the peasant is in the fields; 
the book is mine; he is dead; the enemy is in retreat; the dog is in the 
garden; “Over all the peaks / is peace.” What is evident are the many 
different meanings – from the everyday to the poetic – gathered in the 
word “is,” which are really evident only if we take the “is” not in a for-
mal manner as having something like a predicative or existential func-
tion, but in a concrete manner pertaining to real usage in life (which 
I earlier called “factical language”). As Heidegger says, the meaning 
of the “is” in those sentences emerges only if we engage the word “as 
it actually happens, that is, as spoken each time [jeweils] from out of a 
particular situation, task, and mood, and not as mere propositions and 
stale examples in a grammar book” (ga  40: 95/97). Heidegger offers 
that in each of those sentences “being opens up to us in a manifold 
way” (ga  40: 96/98).23 Such openings are more in line with the three 
root meanings of “living,” “emerging,” and “abiding” than with an 
abstract concept of being. In this respect being is not an empty word, 
because “the ‘is’ evinces in its saying a rich manifoldness of meaning” 
(ga  40: 97/99). Without our having to meditate on the philosophical 
meaning of being, the “is” in its manifold meanings “simply wells up 
in our saying,” and not in an arbitrary manner.24
 Then Heidegger asks what he calls a decisive question (ga  40: 
97/99): Is the manifold meaning of the “is” based simply on the dif-
ferent meanings expressed in each sentence, or does the “is” – as being 
– itself make possible our access to those meanings? He indicates that 
for now this question can be left open. But it is obvious that the second 
option is what drives Heidegger as a thinker. At the end of Being and 
Time, after the phenomenological treatment of Dasein’s being-in-the-
world, care, being-toward-death, and temporality has been filled out, 
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Heidegger asks if this has prepared us for an understanding of the 
meaning of being in general, as that which makes possible Dasein’s 
disclosive understanding of being (ga  2: 576/sz  437). Here Heidegger 
is following a familiar philosophical agenda of searching for a singular 
term that can assume some kind of primary, fundamental position.25 
For me, this is where the trouble starts.
 It was only after I learned about formal indication that Being and 
Time opened up to me in a powerful way. I have never been able to un-
derstand why Heidegger did not provide an explicit treatment of formal 
indication in Being and Time, as he did in some of the surrounding lec-
ture courses. In any case, what I have to say may amount to a departure 
from Heidegger’s thinking, but that remains to be seen. I read every 
basic concept in Being and Time as a formal indication. Some concepts 
are nothing more than indications of something factical, while oth-
ers gather a focal meaning of factical experience. Language (Sprache), 
for instance, simply indicates language uses, while Rede gathers the 
important sense of communicative talk. Care (Sorge) likewise carries 
a focal meaning, particularly the twofold sense of caring and anxious 
worry (ga  2: 264/sz  199).
 I also want to say that “being” is itself a formal indication, which 
came to me more clearly reading the two chapters from Introduction 
to Metaphysics treated in this essay. When Heidegger affirms both the 
verbal substantive “being” and the manifold meanings of the verb “to 
be” covered up by that grammatical substantive, it seems to me that 
such a conjunction perfectly fits the notion of formal indication.26 The 
word “being” can simply point to the various uses illustrated in the 
sentences cited earlier, thereby pointing not only to factical life but 
factical language as well. Yet this indicative function would not be suf-
ficient because Heidegger’s phenomenology always presses on to bring 
out a deeper meaning of being opened up by temporality, anxiety, and 
being-toward-death – namely that the meaning of being is radically 
finite, in the sense of being interwoven with nonbeing, absence, and 
concealment.27 But any such deepening of the meaning of being would 
still involve an indicative relation to a factical experience of, and en-
counter with, finitude – including factical linguistic annunciations of 
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finitude in real-life uses of the verb “to be” (think of the impact in 
1963 of “President Kennedy is dead” – compared to the lifeless logical 
deployment of the proposition “All men are mortal”).
L ANGUAGE, FORMAL INDICATION, AND THE SACHE
There is a primal matter for thought, a Sache, that runs through Hei-
degger’s entire course of exploring the Seinsfrage, which I would char-
acterize as follows: being understood as the temporal structure of the 
emergence of meaning, which is finite in being infused with absence, 
concealment, and limits, which is gathered in language, and which 
exceeds beings, ourselves included, as the processual environment in 
which human beings find themselves and dwell in disclosive under-
standing. It is the excessive character of being that prompted Heidegger 
to look past human subjectivity and announce the processual environ-
ment with words like Ereignis, Lichtung, and Gelassenheit. With ad-
equate acclimation to the Sache, I think that any of these words will 
do, even the word “being.”28 I say this because any such word is simply 
indicative of the Sache, along with the factical world and experiential 
engagement that (I would hope) can never be separated from Hei-
degger’s project of thought, even the most meditative musings in the 
later writings. In other words, I want to say that any of the keywords 
mentioned above should be read as formal indications – which means 
that such notions are nothing more than words, understood as “gather-
ing points” that gesture away from themselves toward the full sense of 
the Sache as I have described it.
 As noted earlier, Heidegger had warned about the danger of missing 
the indicative function of philosophical concepts by getting absorbed 
in formal concepts alone – a warning that applied to his own efforts as 
well. I want to reinforce this warning with respect to some tendencies 
in the later Heidegger and in our own posture as Heidegger scholars. 
Inspired by Heidegger’s grammatical investigations in Introduction to 
Metaphysics, I want to examine the way in which the grammar of Hei-
degger’s sentences (and our own) can prompt a regrettable divergence 
from the indicative character of philosophical words.
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 From the start, Heidegger’s investigations insisted on the “ontologi-
cal difference” between being and beings, which at least in the early 
phenomenology carried a twofold sense: 1) being pertains to meaning 
and not entities per se; and 2) meaning is constituted by a negative 
dimension that exceeds beings and meaning, which shows the radical 
finitude of being. The ontological difference prompted Heidegger to 
search for a language that could give voice to the difference, which is 
named in words or phrases such as “being itself,” “being as such,” “be-
ing as being,” and “beyng,” followed by later words such as Ereignis 
and Lichtung.29 In any case, the difference between being and beings 
naturally prompts us to put our attention on being as distinct from 
beings. But Heidegger was usually careful to say that whatever can be 
said of being, it is always the being of beings, that being is not some 
sphere unto itself. The being of beings disciplines us to always remain 
within the sphere of factical existence. Yet the force of grammatical 
nominalization can encourage or tempt us to ask if being itself “is” in 
any way something unto itself, or at least to abide with scholarly focus 
on nominalized terms for the purpose of locating the most original one 
and laboring over the task of its proper characterization.
 It is this domain of thinking that I am trying to interrogate criti-
cally. For me, it is the Sache described earlier that matters for thought, 
and as long as the Sache is in view it does not matter what term we 
assign to it, so long as it is appropriately indicative of the Sache. Hence 
I am calling for “term limits,” which will warn us against hypostasiza-
tion or getting bogged down in scholarly arcaneness. But I am especially 
calling for caution about Heidegger’s tendency to talk about being or 
Ereignis making “possible” our access to things, or “giving” or “send-
ing” advents of meaning to us. Unless such notions are significantly 
restricted in certain (poetic?) ways, I want to resist. For me, being does 
not make anything possible, or give or send anything. If I am wrong 
from an exegetical standpoint, then so much the worse for Heidegger. 
I prefer to say that being or Ereignis are words that point to the Sache 
and its factical significance. Rather than making something “possible,” 
such words can help make something intelligible, or gather its meaning, 
or open us to its radiance.
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 I am comfortable with a sentence like this from “Letter on Human-
ism”: “Everything depends on this alone, that the truth of being come 
to language and that thinking attend to this language” (ga  9: 344/261). 
I get uncomfortable with sentences like these from Time and Being: 
“The sending of the destiny of being [is] a giving in which the send-
ing source keeps itself back, and thus withdraws from unconcealment” 
(ga  14: 27/22); “Man belongs to Ereignis” (ga  14: 28/23); Ereignis is 
“the extending and sending which opens and preserves” (ga  14: 26/20). 
To maintain discipline in this matter, it would help to add to, or hold 
implicit in, any such usage the following construction: “The word (or 
phrase) X points to sachlich condition Y.” So with “Man belongs to 
Ereignis,” we would mean “Human beings belong to what the word 
Ereignis indicates.” Or with “Being itself withdraws from unconceal-
ment,” we mean “The phrase ‘being withdraws’ points to the excess of 
finitude in every emergence.” Or the phrase “The sending of being is a 
giving” points to a receptive bearing that can remedy the humanistic 
myopia of a technological age. I realize that such a maneuver can seem 
finicky or even a deflation of the power of Heidegger’s language. Yet 
I worry that some of his sentences display something more than the 
crucial matters of thought in question or the necessary grammatical 
modulations required for such thinking. Too often the tenor of Hei-
degger’s later language sounds more monastic than philosophical, more 
a dwelling in a precious domain of meditation than an indication of 
factical existence. Perhaps the disaster of Heidegger’s factical interests 
in the 1930s caused him to drift into a kind of cloistered disposition – 
which is the only way I can account for some of his embarrassing talk 
of the “essence” of something exceeding any factical instance – as in 
the essence of homelessness versus the need for housing (ga  7: 163/plt 
158–59), or the “essential” sameness of mechanized agriculture and the 
manufacture of corpses in concentration camps. I confess that I do not 
readily understand what Heidegger was talking about, but if there is 
something to learn here, I still don’t see the point.
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Notes
1 Parts of this article are drawn from my essay, “The Hurdle of 
Words: Language, Being, and Philosophy in Heidegger,” in The 
Hermeneutical Heidegger, eds. Ingo Farin and Michael Bowler 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2016), 262–82.
2 In Being and Time, Heidegger occasionally uses variants of for-
male and Anzeige in different ways, without the precise phrase 
(ga  2: 237, 417/sz  179, 315). The specific phrase “formal indica-
tion” is used a number of times (ga  2: 153, 307, 415/sz  114, 231, 
313). In one case, when discussing selfhood in terms of the “I,” 
Heidegger distinguishes between a merely formal, reflective 
awareness of the “I” and phenomenological attention to the func-
tion of the word “I,” which is to be “understood only in the sense 
of a non-binding formal indication” – especially as this leads in 
the direction of Dasein’s selfhood understood as a who rather than 
a what (ga  2: 155/sz  116). In a letter to Karl Löwith (August 20, 
1927), Heidegger comments on the tacit function of formal indica-
tion in Being and Time: “Formal indications . . . [are] still there 
for me even if I do not speak of them now.” He warns against a 
hasty deployment of expressions from the lecture courses. Yet 
later in the 1929–30 lecture course (ga  29/30), Heidegger will 
present one of his most detailed treatments of formal indication 
(section 70), and something of that sort would have greatly fa-
cilitated a comprehension of Being and Time. For helpful discus-
sions of formal indication, see Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s 
Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications,” Review 
of Metaphysics 47: 4 (1994), 775–95; John Van Buren, “The Eth-
ics of Formale Anzeige in Heidegger,” American Catholic Philo-
sophical Quarterly 69: 2 (1995), 157–70; and Theodore Kisiel, The 
Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1993).
3 Facticity is not the “factual” in the modern sense of objective real-
ity or causal explanations; it is marked by historical contingency 
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and enactment (ga  60: 9/7). Factical life experience is not a 
“what” but the meaningfulness (Bedeutsamkeit) of life concerns 
and how such concerns are engaged (ga  60: 11–12/9).
4 Heidegger specifically distinguishes formalization from gener-
alization (ga  60: 57–65/39–45): Generalization constructs a set of 
common properties drawn from ontical procedures of collection 
and division; formalization is a non-theoretical gathering of the 
sense of specific differences drawn from concernful dealings and 
geared toward tasks of enactment (see also ga 29/30: 12/9).
5 There are other early lecture courses that explain and utilize 
formal indication. See especially ga  59, which deploys formal 
indication extensively. Dahlstrom’s article cited in note 2 provides 
the numerous page references for that text (784n34).
6 See “What is Metaphysics?” in ga 9 and ga  45.
7 Section 34 actually emphasizes Rede (usually translated as “dis-
course) over Sprache, or language. It is better to take Rede in its 
specific sense of “talk,” face-to-face conservation. Rede is con-
nected with logos (ga  2: 34/sz  25) and is called the precondition 
for Sprache, so that “language” is understood as specific expres-
sions of speech as distinguished from concrete practices of talk-
ing. Face-to-face talk also includes various “non-verbal” elements 
of speech, such as gesture, facial expression, intonation, rhythm, 
silence, listening, and responding (ga  2: 215–16/sz  162–63). 
8 A recent account presuming a pre-linguistic sense of truth is 
Mark Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Lan-
guage, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), Ch. 2.
9 It is crucial to stress the communicative element of speech here 
because the cogency of such an example shines in depicting speech 
partners pointing-out, speaking-out (aussagen) to each other in 
immediate circumstances of disclosive conversation. Rede, as the 
practice of communication, is therefore always an understanding-
with (Mitverstehen), in line with the Mitsein character of being-
in-the-world (ga  2: 215/sz  162). For a helpful essay on language 
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and communication in Heidegger, see Jeffrey Powell, “Heidegger 
and the Communicative World,” Research in Phenomenology 40 
(2010), 55–71.
10 Zuhandenheit should not be restricted to mere instrumental con-
ditions because it covers the full range of Dasein’s immersion 
in pre-reflective engagement with its environment, including 
things like house and yard, even natural phenomena such as 
sunlight and heat (ga  24: 152–53, 431–45/108, 303–13). See also ga 
2: 90–102/sz  66–76 and ga  20: 259–69/191–98.
11 One way to understand unconcealment in relation to correspon-
dence is that the normal functioning of speech presupposes a tacit 
trust in appropriate disclosure (“truth” is etymologically related 
to “trust”). Correspondence cannot capture this tacit functioning, 
but can come into play once the trust in speech is broken or dis-
rupted in various ways. Without such background functioning of 
disclosive trust, human existence could never get off the ground, 
and Heidegger’s concept of unconcealment as dis-closure is meant 
to indicate this background.
12 In ga  21 Heidegger indicates that formal propositions of the kind 
“S is P” are withdrawn from lived involvement and concerns (ga 
21: 153–58/129–33). With the spoken assertion “This chalk is too 
scratchy,” it is not a matter of describing an object with properties; 
its meaning is that there is an obstacle to writing.
13 See my discussion in Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contribu-
tions to Moral Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2000), 33–34.
14 All translations from Time and Being are my own.
15 At one point in Being and Time, Heidegger acknowledges the 
circularity of his own text as interpretation: It cannot engage in 
“proof,” but only an “allowing to come into words” of an under-
standing of being, from which readers can discern for themselves 
whether the text’s “formal-indicative sketch” is disclosive of un-
derstanding or not (ga  2: 416–17/sz  314–15). In other words, there 
is no free-standing measure for the success of a text.
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16 One significant treatment is Gregory Fried, “What’s in a Word? 
Heidegger’s Grammar and Etymology of ‘Being,’” in A Compan-
ion to Heidegger’s “Introduction to Metaphysics,” eds. Richard Polt 
and Gregory Fried (New Haven, CT: Yale, 2001), 125–42.
17 The English word “being” is a gerund, a verbal noun that is not 
inflected, as in “My being here is a mistake.”
18 As Heidegger says in an early lecture course, “the categories of 
grammar in fact originate in those of living speech, in those of 
the imminent speaking of life itself” (ga  61: 83/63).
19 The same procedure is found in the Greek to einai.
20 In Being and Time, language itself is constituted by temporality 
(ga  2: 462/sz  349–50).
21 As Heidegger indicates (ga  40: 68/70), the grammatical objec-
tification of language was made possible by writing (in Greek, 
grammata referred to written letters), where words become fixed 
in space as stable entities, as opposed to the impermanent flow 
of speech. Factical language is best understood in its oral aspect 
rather than its written form. Note Heidegger’s remark in the 
Preface: “What is spoken no longer speaks in what is printed” 
(ga  40: xi/xiv). The way in which the orality-literacy distinction 
contributes to the questions at hand is a significant area that has 
not received much attention.
22 Fried indicates that modern linguistics supports Heidegger’s ac-
count (Fried, “What’s in a Word?” 131).
23 In the “Protocol” to Time and Being (ga  14: 47–49/38–40), a set 
of poetic lines from Trakl and Rimbaud are cited as instances 
of “simple language” that can better show the force of “is” and 
“there is” (es gibt): for example, “It is a light that the wind has 
extinguished,” and “There is a clock that does not strike.”
24 For a helpful sketch of how Heidegger’s account compares with 
familiar approaches to the function of the word “being” (e.g., as 
a copula), especially how a “veridical” sense advanced by Charles 
Kahn overcomes the claim that ontology is only a matter relative 
to particular languages, see Fried, “What’s in a Word?” 136–41.
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25 Denis McManus provides a useful analysis of Heidegger’s search 
for a unified conception of being, along with the difficulties faced 
in such a project in the light of standard philosophical construc-
tions. See his “Ontological Pluralism and the Being and Time 
Project,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 51: 4 (2013): 651–73. 
There is a sense in which Heidegger’s ontological agenda com-
pares with that of Aristotle, who saw the need to articulate the 
meaning of being in a primary sense, or being understood as 
being. Unlike Plato, for Aristotle being (ousia) is not a genus or 
a universal. It has a referential unity in the manner of its “focal 
meaning” (pros hen equivocity), where the word ousia gathers the 
different kinds and modes of being without unifying them ac-
cording to some common characteristic (see Metaphysics 1003a33–
1003b19). But there is a “metaphysical” sense of ousia with respect 
to the causal function of the unmoved mover. See Enrico Berti, 
“Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 101: 1 (2001): 185–207. Short of the unmoved 
mover, the focal meaning of being is like the hub of a wheel that 
gathers different spokes together while giving each spoke its own 
space – which in my estimation carries an “indicative” function.
26 In ga  61 Heidegger provides a grammatical analysis of the nomi-
nal term “life” as a formally indicative gathering of factical uses 
of the verb “to live” (ga  61: 79–99/61–75), which is also conjoined 
with the concept of being (ga  61: 84/64), thus forecasting the as-
sociation of being and living in Introduction to Metaphysics.
27 In Chapter Three of Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger notes 
that one way in which being can exhibit a kind of definiteness as 
opposed to empty generality is in its relation to nonbeing (ga  40: 
83/85).
28 Richard Capobianco has argued that the question of being runs 
through Heidegger’s entire career. See his Engaging Heidegger 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). I owe some of my 
characterization of the Seinsfrage to his formulation on pages 4 
and 50. My review of the book is published in Gatherings 1 (2011): 
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86–93. There is even a sense in which the later Heidegger re-
mained within the sphere of his own version of phenomenology. 
See ga  15: 288, 301, 305, 320–22/11, 19, 22, 31–32.
29 The later terminology seems to go further than being, as that 
which “gives” being. Yet Capobianco has suggested that here “be-
ing” names metaphysical conceptions of the beingness of beings, 
and that something like Ereignis is still within the orbit of pri-
mal being. See his helpful organization of this point in Engaging 
Heidegger (8–9).
